From eradication to interdiction: Evolution of counternarcotics policy
July 30, 2014 Leave a comment
Syed Zafar Mehdi
Notwithstanding the strenuous efforts by government and the international community to dissuade farmers in Afghanistan from opium plantation, the year 2013 again proved to be a damp squib, as the fields growing poppies in the country alarmingly increased to 209,000 hectares, according to UN’s Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2013, conducted in collaboration with Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghan government. Afghanistan continues to be the world’s top opium producer, and interestingly the area covered by the opium in Afghanistan equals to the total area of Mauritius.
“This is the third consecutive year of increase in poppy cultivation,” says Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Afghanistan Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. According to UN officials, the poppy farming is unlikely to drop before the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, and it might only get worse after that.
The question hovering on everyone’s mind, however, is: Who benefits most from this opium cultivation and why the government efforts to curb it have proved a disaster? How will this burgeoning poppy economy play out after the withdrawal of foreign troops by the end of this year?
With the security situation rapidly deteriorating and the international forces getting ready to bid adieu to the beleaguered country, the opium producers and their backers are making merry. Opium fields in Afghanistan are the main sources of revenue to power lords and source of sustenance to poor farmers. According to UNODC-Ministry of Counter Narcotics 2013 survey, there was 36 percent increase in the area under opium cultivation in 2013. The opium production went up to 5,500 tonnes, registering 49 percent jump from 2012. Faryab and Balkh, the two provinces that had been declared poppy-free went back to square one.
The question hovering on everyone’s mind is: Who benefits most from this opium cultivation and why the government efforts to curb it have proved a disaster?
“The prime factors responsible for this jump in opium cultivation are insecurity and poverty,” says Abdul Qayoom Samer, Spokesman for Ministry of Counter Narcotics. He says there is a strong network of insurgents and International drug mafia in Afghanistan. “The increase in opium cultivation is basically in the five southern provinces of country including Helmand and Kandahar, which are infested with these elements.”
The staggering value of opium makes it alluring to farmers who have to support their large families. According to experts, the increase in value of opium in 2012 was one of the prime factors behind the boost in opium cultivation in 2013, mostly in southern and western parts of Afghanistan. “The farmers were definitely encouraged by the jump in opium prices in 2012, which resulted in the increace of 36 percent in opium cultivation in 2013,” says Mohammad Hashim, social activist. The grinding web of poverty in these provinces is also a big factor for them to cultivate poppy, says Mr. Samer.
According to information from Ministry of Anti Narcotics, an astounding 89 percent of total opium production in 2013 was reported from nine provinces in southern and western Afghanistan. Helmand province continued to be the major poppy-cultivating province with 34 percent cultivation, followed by Kandahar with 16 percent. In the eastern part of country, which accounts for mere 9 percent of total opium cultivation, Nangarhar recorded fivefold increase and Laghman saw increase by 41 percent. In the northeast region, Badakhshan witnessed an increase in poppy cultivation by 23 percent.
Evolution of anti-narcotics policy
At a time when opium economy is on rise, the counternarcotics policies of Afghan government and international community have assumed critical importance, not only for curbing the cultivation of opium but also for security and rule of law in the country. Much to the chagrin of those leading the anti narcotics movement, the counternarcotics policies have failed to bring down the illicit economy of opium in the country.
“When the international forces intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, their single point agenda was to oust Taliban and facilitate transition from anarchy to democracy,” says Nawaz Noorani, a political analyst. “Counternarcotics did not figure prominently on their agenda.” In 2002, UK’s assistance mission in Afghanistan was entrusted with a task of eradicating narcotics. They started warily, with ‘compensated eradication’ program, under which the farmers who voluntarily eradicated the poppies got compensation. But, it was hindered by corruption and abandoned midway. The ‘eradication’ program was followed by ‘interdiction’ program in 2004, and it was targeted largely against small dealers while the big fishes sitting atop the illicit trade were left untouched.
“There was a calculated shift in the counternarcotics policies adopted by U.S. in 2009, when Obama administration made a big gamble, which has only proved a disaster,” says Mr. Noorani. The shift was from the 30-year old policy of eradication or annihilation to interdiction or prohibition. Eradication policy of counternarcotics, which was applied for 30 years, was based on force, where officials used to forcibly eradicate the illicit crops. On the other hand, interdiction policy, adopted in 2009, exhorted opium producers and traffickers to shun the practice.
At a time when opium economy is on rise, the counternarcotics policies of Afghan government and international community have assumed critical importance
“The policy of eradication only helps drug producers and traffickers as they benefit from huge stockpiles of poppy that they sell at a staggering price because of increased demand,” says Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The two main elements of interdiction policy in Afghanistan has been interdiction of drug traffickers and rural development. The idea is to deprive armed insurgents weapons, money and drugs and force them to retreat. Thousands of interdiction raids have been carried out and tons of opium has been seized, yet the cultivation and trafficking has not stopped.
A report by Center for International Cooperation (CIC) challenged this assumption. “Current counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan is financially benefiting – rather than hurting – insurgents,” it says. The policy should be refocused to discriminate against illegal armed groups and corrupt officials in enforcement, it suggests.
The U.S. policy encompasses the counternarcotics ‘alternative livelihood’ program. In 2009, the then Helmand Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal distributed free wheat seeds to discourage farmers from cultivating poppy. The program clicked and was extended to other provinces as well. “Alternative livelihood programs are an essential component of the overall counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan,” read the 2010 report by the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
Scenario post 2014
At a panel discussion held by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and U.S. Institute of Peace on U.S. counternarcotics policies in July last year, the former Minister of Counter Narcotics Zarar Ahmad Muqbel emphasized on having a ‘long-term, balanced and comprehensive approach’ to the challenge of combating drugs in Afghanistan and draw direct link between narcotics and insurgency. “The narcotics of all forms are a serious threat to the peace and security of Afghanistan,” he noted.
With the change of guard in Kabul now, followed by the withdrawal of international forces, the concerns over the effectiveness of current counternarcotics policy have gained ground. The latest reports about cultivation of opium touching a new high in 2013 and 2014 are signs of what lies ahead. Experts fear the lack of security might make ground fertile for the return of large-scale opium trade. However, it will depend on the effectiveness of Afghan security forces.
Samer, however, sees no direct connection between counter-insurgency and opium cultivation. “I do not think the withdrawal of foreign forces will affect the opium business,” he says. “But, there is a possibility of security situation deteriorating after 2014, and insecurity is linked to opium, so there is an indirect link.”
(First published in Afghan Zariza)
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